Projects:2020s1-1290 Car Hacking - Revision history

A1707461: /* Conclusion */

2021-03-19T05:07:27Z

‎Conclusion

A1707461: /* Future Work */

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‎Future Work

A1707461: /* USB exploit successful */

2021-03-19T05:06:39Z

‎USB exploit successful

A1707461: /* Aim 3 */

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‎Aim 3

A1707461: /* USB injection */

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‎USB injection

A1707461: /* Introduction */

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‎Introduction

A1686599: /* Aim 2 */

2020-10-19T05:01:52Z

‎Aim 2

A1686599: /* Aim 2 */

2020-10-19T05:00:37Z

‎Aim 2

A1686599: /* USB injection */

2020-10-19T04:58:50Z

‎USB injection

A1686599: /* USB injection */

2020-10-19T04:58:26Z

‎USB injection

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 FlexRay is often used to communicate between safety-critical aspects of vehicles including steering and brakes. With the increasing number of autonomous systems and the interconnectivity of networks in vehicles increasing, the security of FlexRay becomes even more important.
-With widespread reliance on CAN and USB, rolling out effective vulnerability countermeasures to all existing instances is infeasible. However, vulnerabilities and practices explored in our research are worth taking into consideration in the design of critical systems that may need to depend on these technologies.
+With widespread reliance on CAN, rolling out effective vulnerability countermeasures to all existing instances is infeasible. However, vulnerabilities and practices explored in our research are worth taking into consideration in the design of critical systems that may need to depend on these technologies.
 === Future Work ===

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 == References ==

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 The end result is that the attacks are not allowed to transmit outside of a valid time slot or to paths that are restricted and will simply be blocked at the gateway. Thus, in the past where a bad actor may have been able to gain control of  car, now, at best can cause transmission losses through packet collisions on the network.
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← Older revision		Revision as of 05:06, 19 March 2021
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	'''Approach:''' Identify CAN bus shortcomings, consider flow control, TDMA, and “allowed paths” to design and implement a retrofittable solution to critical CAN systems.		'''Approach:''' Identify CAN bus shortcomings, consider flow control, TDMA, and “allowed paths” to design and implement a retrofittable solution to critical CAN systems.

−	~~<br>~~
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−	~~===Aim 3===~~
−	~~[[File:Input-injection-diagram.png\|400px\|thumb\|right\|Input Injection Sequence Diagram]]~~
−	Investigating an “input injection” exploit of USB 2.0 systems whereby a device connected to a PC is able to spoof the input of another concurrently connected device. The vulnerability exploited is USB’s means of attributing device input data to its source.
−
−	~~'''Approach:''' Determine necessary conditions for achieving input injection. Create proof-of-concept for exploit evaluation.~~
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−	~~<br>~~
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← Older revision		Revision as of 05:06, 19 March 2021
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	There has also been an attack on a FlexRay network using a CAN network. This attack involved creating a gateway that would convert CAN packets to FlexRay. This attack then sent CAN messages to override specific bits on a FlexRay bus to control the EPS (Electric Power Steering) [4].		There has also been an attack on a FlexRay network using a CAN network. This attack involved creating a gateway that would convert CAN packets to FlexRay. This attack then sent CAN messages to override specific bits on a FlexRay bus to control the EPS (Electric Power Steering) [4].
−
−	~~=== USB injection ===~~
−	~~[[File:USB_topology.png\|thumb\| right\| 500px\|Bus Topology and Traffic Flow]]~~
−	USB is the de facto standard for peripheral-computer interconnection. Ease of use has always been at the forefront of the technology's design principles, leaving security largely overlooked. This makes USB compelling for malicious actors to leverage for violating the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data.
−
−	USB communication is host-arbitrated and non-encrypted. Its architecture is one of a shared bus configuration on computer systems. The shared bus is arranged in tiered star topology, at the root is the USB host root hub embedded within the PC (internal hub) which provides device attachment points for connecting periph- erals or hubs. External hubs provide additional attachment points for devices onto the bus network.
−
−	Hubs (including root hubs) repeat the flow of data, facilitating two types of data traffic flow: upstream and downstream. Upstream traffic from transmitting devices is sent to the higher tier attachment point up the chain, creating a single data path reaching the host. Downstream traffic originates from the host and in USB 2.0 it is broadcast to all attached devices in the lower tier. To manage multiple ports con- necting to a single host, the host communicates with devices one at a time, polling them for input. Since this poll is a broadcast downstream transmission, the intended recipient is specified in an address portion of the transmitted packet. It is the respon- sibility of the devices on the bus to respond if they are addressed, otherwise ignoring the transmission.

	== Project Aims and Method ==		== Project Aims and Method ==

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 # How the security of CAN-based communication in vehicles could be improved (Adam Watts),
 # Investigating the interoperability and mapping of the CAN and FlexRay protocols (Alexis Jennings),
-It has been shown in several previous studies that CAN-based communication is vulnerable to numerous attacks, thus improving the security of CAN-based communication is vital to improving the security of the vehicle. Similarly, a FlexRay-CAN gateway will be developed to allow an investigation into the vulnerabilities of connecting several bus systems that follow different protocols together. In addition, this project will explore the USB protocol and attempt to demonstrate input injection on behalf of another connected USB device. Although none of these protocols prioritise security, severe consequences could occur if attacked by an adversary.
+It has been shown in several previous studies that CAN-based communication is vulnerable to numerous attacks, thus improving the security of CAN-based communication is vital to improving the security of the vehicle. Similarly, a FlexRay-CAN gateway will be developed to allow an investigation into the vulnerabilities of connecting several bus systems that follow different protocols together. Although none of these protocols prioritise security, severe consequences could occur if attacked by an adversary.
 == Background and Relevant Work==

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 Improving the security of CAN-based communication in existing vehicles. Extensive research into the vulnerabilities of CAN bus has shown that not only is it possible to inject attacks, but there are multiple attack vectors. This past research has indicated a need for defensive tools and techniques that could be used to mitigate these attacks and improve the security of the inherently insecure communication method.
-'''Approach:'''  Identify CAN bus shortcomings. Consider flow control, TDMA, and “allowed paths” to design and implement a retrofittable solution to critical CAN systems.
+'''Approach:'''  Identify CAN bus shortcomings, consider flow control, TDMA, and “allowed paths” to design and implement a retrofittable solution to critical CAN systems.
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 === USB injection ===
 USB is the de facto standard for peripheral-computer interconnection. Ease of use has always been at the forefront of the technology's design principles, leaving security largely overlooked. This makes USB compelling for malicious actors to leverage for violating the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data.
 USB communication is host-arbitrated and non-encrypted. Its architecture is one of a shared bus configuration on computer systems. The shared bus is arranged in tiered star topology, at the root is the USB host root hub embedded within the PC (internal hub) which provides device attachment points for connecting periph- erals or hubs. External hubs provide additional attachment points for devices onto the bus network.

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 USB is the de facto standard for peripheral-computer interconnection. Ease of use has always been at the forefront of the technology's design principles, leaving security largely overlooked. This makes USB compelling for malicious actors to leverage for violating the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data.
-[[File:USB_topology.png|0.4px|frame|right| Bus Topology and Traffic Flow]]
+[[File:USB_topology.png|thumb| right| 500px|Bus Topology and Traffic Flow]]
 USB communication is host-arbitrated and non-encrypted. Its architecture is one of a shared bus configuration on computer systems. The shared bus is arranged in tiered star topology, at the root is the USB host root hub embedded within the PC (internal hub) which provides device attachment points for connecting periph- erals or hubs. External hubs provide additional attachment points for devices onto the bus network.