Difference between revisions of "Projects:2017s1-167b Real Time Video Steam Substitution"
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| + | == Introduction == | ||
| + | NATO’s Locked Shields [1] is an annual (since 2010) live-fire cyber defence exercise organised to aid in the training of security experts tasked with protecting national IT systems. The scenario-based exercise focuses on the attack and defence of network and service infrastructure of a fictional country, including military command and control systems, electrical power grid systems and unmanned aerial vehicles. One such attack performed at the 2017 event focused on the substitution of footage from a military drone’s real-time video feed. The defence network was compromised with the video feed replaced and displayed on screen. This was achieved via the use of VLC command line options. | ||
| + | Taking inspiration from the recently concluded event and the attack performed on the drone, this project investigates how a real-time video stream can be seamlessly substituted whilst going undetected. Consequently, the investigation will generate the need for further research into uncovered vulnerabilities and their potential solutions. | ||
| + | |||
== Abstract == | == Abstract == | ||
| − | This project looks at intercepting a real-time video stream between | + | This research project looks at how intercepting and substituting the contents of a real-time video stream between a source and end-user over IP may be conducted. The real-time video stream is to be seamlessly substituted with an arbitrary video or an alternate stream. The project aims to identify all the complexities and constraints associated with conducting such a substitution. |
| − | + | The project is divided into two components: | |
| − | • Multimedia Network Security | + | • Multimedia Network Security and |
| − | |||
• Video stream Substitution | • Video stream Substitution | ||
| + | The Multimedia Network Security aspect of the project considers different attack strategies which can be implemented to gain access to the real-time stream. This is while also keeping the end users unaware of any breaches in the network. Different session hijacking techniques and their complexities are to be examined. As a starting point, it is assumed network encryption is omitted. | ||
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| − | |||
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| − | + | == Project Members == | |
| − | Matt Reynolds | + | • Matt Reynolds |
| − | Harish Gowda | + | • Harish Gowda |
| − | + | == Project Supervisor == | |
| − | Matthew Sorell | + | • Matthew Sorell |
Revision as of 10:34, 30 October 2017
Introduction
NATO’s Locked Shields [1] is an annual (since 2010) live-fire cyber defence exercise organised to aid in the training of security experts tasked with protecting national IT systems. The scenario-based exercise focuses on the attack and defence of network and service infrastructure of a fictional country, including military command and control systems, electrical power grid systems and unmanned aerial vehicles. One such attack performed at the 2017 event focused on the substitution of footage from a military drone’s real-time video feed. The defence network was compromised with the video feed replaced and displayed on screen. This was achieved via the use of VLC command line options. Taking inspiration from the recently concluded event and the attack performed on the drone, this project investigates how a real-time video stream can be seamlessly substituted whilst going undetected. Consequently, the investigation will generate the need for further research into uncovered vulnerabilities and their potential solutions.
Abstract
This research project looks at how intercepting and substituting the contents of a real-time video stream between a source and end-user over IP may be conducted. The real-time video stream is to be seamlessly substituted with an arbitrary video or an alternate stream. The project aims to identify all the complexities and constraints associated with conducting such a substitution. The project is divided into two components: • Multimedia Network Security and • Video stream Substitution The Multimedia Network Security aspect of the project considers different attack strategies which can be implemented to gain access to the real-time stream. This is while also keeping the end users unaware of any breaches in the network. Different session hijacking techniques and their complexities are to be examined. As a starting point, it is assumed network encryption is omitted.
Project Members
• Matt Reynolds
• Harish Gowda
Project Supervisor
• Matthew Sorell
